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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 
Volume 17 Winter 1999 Number 1 
FIFTH ANNUAL LLOYD K. GARRISON 
LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Thirty Years of Environmental Protection 
Law in the Supreme Court 
RICHARD J. LAZARUS* 
It is an honor to present a lecture named after Lloyd Garrison 
and to be here at Pace Law School. It is especially fitting, of 
course, that the first Garrison Lecture was presented by Pace's 
own David Sive. Professor Sive, as we all know, worked closely 
with Garrison on the celebrated Scenic Hudson litigation. l Few 
legal counsel have been so closely identified with the emergence of 
the environmental law profession during the past three decades. 
* John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
This article and the underlying factual information was first presented at Pace Law 
School on March 11, 1999, as the Fifth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environ-
mental Law, but has been updated in light of a few events occurring subsequent to 
that presentation. Because this lecture does not lend itself to a full presentation of 
the statistical compilation of United States Supreme Court rulings underlying the 
lecture or to a complete elaboration of the related analysis, that fuller version is being 
separately published. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental" 
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703 (2000). Spe-
cial thanks are owed to Staci Krupp, J.D. Candidate 2000, Georgetown University 
Law Center, and Alex Steffan, J.D. 1999, Georgetown University Law Center, who 
provided excellent research assistance in the preparation of the initial lecture and 
this article. This article discusses Supreme Court decisions in many cases, including 
some in which I served as counsel for parties involved in the litigation. The views 
expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of those 
parties I represented. 
1. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
1 
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Indeed, if there were such a thing as a legal thesaurus that linked 
substantive areas oflaw with lawyers and one looked up "environ-
mental law," its first synonym would undoubtedly be "David 
Sive."2 
I do not and could not, however, make claim to the extraordi-
nary pedigree of David Sive: one of the first of the very first gener-
ation of modern environmental lawyers in this country. Nor can a 
fair comparison be made to the other three Garrison Lecturers 
who preceded me: Professors Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers, and Oliver 
Houck. These are true pioneers. They inspired much in the for-
mation of modern environmental protection law, and have served 
since in their scholarship and their legal counsel as the law's 
guardians and promoters. 
But what I strive to claim is a close lineage, as the first of the 
second generation of environmental lawyers and scholars to de-
liver this lecture. I use the term "lineage" deliberately. For 
although I did not then know any of them by name, it was the 
work of Lloyd Garrison, David Sive, and the others that resulted 
in my own decision to engage in the study and practice of environ-
mental law. 
I made my decision to become an environmental lawyer dur-
ing my freshman year in college in 1971, because of the events 
then occurring in our nation. Like many of my contemporaries in 
environmental law, I saw as my role models those environmental 
law activists who seemed to be shaping the nation's future in nec-
essary and positive ways. So it should be no surprise that I feel a 
great debt to those who preceded me as Garrison lecturers, and to 
Lloyd Garrison, whom I never had the pleasure to meet. 
As much as I deliberately, if not obsessively, struck a path of 
becoming an environmental lawyer and law professor twenty-
eight years ago, the actual direction of that path has necessarily 
been the result of much happenstance and fortuity. One bit of 
good fortune has been my consistent involvement with the U.S. 
Supreme Court, both as a practicing lawyer and a legal academic.3 
2. Professor Sive is often referred to as the "father of environmental law." See 
Margaret Cronin Fisk, Profiles in Power 100 - The Most Influential Lawyers in 
America, NAT'L L.J., March 25, 1991, at S2. 
3. I joined the Department of Justice in the fall of 1979, after law school gradua-
tion. The Court soon after granted review in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980), for which I was assigned responsibility for drafting the position of the United 
States as amicus curiae. Since then, I have had the opportunity to represent the fed-
eral government, state and local governments, and environmental groups in a host of 
cases before the Supreme Court. 
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This lecture stems from that work by examining the Supreme 
Court's role in environmental law's evolution during the past 
thirty years, as reflected in the Court's decisions and the votes of 
the individual Justices. My view is that those decisions and votes 
increasingly suggest a lack of appreciation of environmental law 
as a distinct area of law. 
This lecture's objectives are three-fold. The first is perhaps 
somewhat pedantic, but both revealing and even entertaining for 
those (like me) who are preoccupied with the Court. It is to high-
light some facts and figures about the past thirty years of environ-
mental and natural resources law cases before the Court that tell 
much about the Court and the individual Justices. 
The second objective is to suggest what the Court's decisions 
tell us about the nature and practice of environmental law. This 
includes how environmental law relates to other areas of law with 
which it inevitably and repeatedly intersects. It also includes les-
sons regarding how, accordingly, law students who seek to become 
environmental lawyers should approach the study oflaw. It like-
wise extends to how environmental lawyers seeking to promote 
environmental protection and resource conservation can be the 
most effective in litigation. 
The third and final objective is more modest. It is to describe 
a potentially significant case that the Court heard during the Oc-
tober 1999 Term. The case was important because at stake was 
the future role of citizen suit enforcement in environmental law, 
which has long been one of environmental law's essential 
hallmarks.4 More broadly, however, the case proved significant 
because it provided the Court with a much needed opportunity to 
reverse the disturbing trend discernible in its precedent and to 
restore what is "environmental" about environmental law. 
I. A Scorecard Of The Justices' Votes In Environmental 
Cases 
Commencing with the Supreme Court's October Term 1969, 
the Court has decided over 240 environmental and natural re-
sources law cases on the merits.5 There are a host of intriguing 
4. See CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER 
EPA ADMINISTERED STATUTES (Environmental Law Institute 1984). 
5. A listing of the cases is included in an appendix to this article. Whether a case 
is considered "environmental" for the broader purposes of this threshold inquiry turns 
on whether environmental protection or natural resources matters are at stake. The 
legal issue before the Court need not independently have an environmental character 
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factual inquiries that could be undertaken concerning these rul-
ings. This lecture, however, focuses on only three: (1) which Jus-
tices wrote the most decisions for the Court during the past thirty 
years; (2) which Justices have been in the majority the most fre-
quently; and (3) which Justices have tended to vote for outcomes 
that are more rather than less protective of the environment, and 
which Justices have tended to do the converse (that is, less rather 
than more). 
A. Justice White: The Justice Who Wrote the Most 
Environmental Decisions For the Court 
In tallying which Justice has written the most environmental 
opinions for the Court during the past thirty years, one might 
fairly anticipate that the opinions would be split roughly evenly 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist leading the pack. After all, the 
Chief Justice has served longer on the Court than anyone pres-
ently there and his tenure virtually spans the relevant time pe-
riod, with his joining the Court as a Justice in 1971. But it is in 
fact neither the Chief Justice leading the pack nor is it even a 
close question as to who has written the most environmental opin-
ions for the Court. Nineteen Justices have served on the Court 
during the relevant time period6 and Justice White, who left the 
Court in 1993, is the leading opinion writer for the Court by a 
large margin. 
Justice White wrote thirty-six opinions. The next closest is 
Justice O'Connor with twenty-two opinions for the Court. How is 
that revealing? What philosophy does one think about Justice 
White and environmental protection? The fairest answer is none 
at all. 
Justice White harbored no particular interest in environmen-
tal law. His opinions are dispassionate, dry, formalistic, with lit-
tle effort to elaborate any particular philosophical vision. In this 
respect, moreover, his environmental law opinions do not differ 
from his opinions for the Court generally, which a recent biogra-
to it. The stakes themselves are sufficient to invoke the label. The Garrison lecture 
upon which this article is based was delivered on March 11, 1999. Since then, the 
Supreme Court has decided two additional environmental cases, City of Monterey v. 
Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999), and Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute 
Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999), which have been added to the database and, when rele-
vant, to the discussion in the text of this article. 
6. These Justices are: Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Gins-
burg, and Breyer, and there have been two Chief Justices, Burger and Rehnquist. 
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phy describes as evidencing little "elaboration of philosophical vi-
sion"7 and "never aspiring beyond plain, workmanlike prose."8 
Justice White's controlling philosophy (or lack thereof) is ex-
emplified by his votes in three cases during the 1986 October 
Term. The Supreme Court during that term handed down the so-
called "Takings Trilogy," three cases raising Fifth Amendment 
regulatory takings challenges to environmental restrictions: Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,9 First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,1° 
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 11 The juxtaposition 
of these three cases presented a true jurisprudential paradox and 
certainly no readily discernible, coherent view of the Takings 
Clause. 12 
Nor do White's opinions for the Court otherwise suggest any 
distinct vision of the role of law in environmental protection. The 
Official Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall provide another 
clear example. In Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. ,13 Justice White wrote for the Court's 
slim five-Justice majority an opinion that upheld the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) construction of 
the Clean Water Act. As disclosed by the Marshall Papers, how-
ever, he did so only after concluding that there is "little or no dif-
ference in principle" between the opposing arguments and that 
"administrative law will not be measurably advanced or set back 
however this case is decided."14 White did not see the case, which-
ever way it was decided, as being of significant import. The case 
presented only a narrow, fact-bound issue regarding the suffi-
ciency of an administrative record. 
7. DENNIS HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WrZZER WHITE 451 (1998) 
(quoting Kate Stith, Byron White: Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19, n.1 
(1993». 
8. Id. at 454. 
9. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
10. 482 U.s. 304 (1987). 
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
12. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1625 (1988). 
13. 470 U.s. 116 (1985). 
14. Letter from Justice Byron R. White to The Chief Justice, Re: 83-1013 -
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC (November 13, 1984) (Official Papers of the 
Chambers of Justice Thurgood Marshall). 
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B. Justice Kennedy: The Justice Most Often in the Majority in 
Environmental Cases 
Another revealing factual inquiry concerns the frequency 
with which individual Justices were in the majority in environ-
mental cases during the past thirty years. Not surprisingly, Jus-
tice White's percentage for being in the majority is very high; he 
voted with the majority 89.2 percent of the time. His being in the 
majority so often may also provide a neutral explanation for why 
White authored so many opinions for the Court. But opportuni-
ties and opinions do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger, for instance, had an even higher percentage 
for being in the majority and wrote far fewer opinions. The Chief 
Justice was in the majority in over 91.5 percent of the 140 envi-
ronmental cases in which he participated. Yet he wrote only eight 
opinions for the Court. 
The most telling fact about the tendency of Justices to vote in 
the majority, however, does not relate to either Chief Justice Bur-
ger or to Justice White. The Justice with the most astounding rec-
ord for being in the majority is Justice Kennedy. Kennedy has 
participated in fifty-seven cases to date. Other than an original 
action of interstate water dispute,15 he has dissented only once, in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 16 The Court, moreover, has since 
overruled its eleventh amendment decision in Union GasP So, in 
effect, Justice Kennedy's record is virtually 100 percent (putting 
aside a couple of somewhat qualified concurring opinions).l8 
But how many opinions for the Court has Justice Kennedy 
written? One might expect as many as ten but certainly no fewer 
than six. But, in fact, until the Court's most recent term, Kennedy 
had written only two opinions for the Court.19 He added two more 
this past Term.20 Kennedy supplied, moreover, the deciding fifth 
vote in three out of those four cases. 
15. See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991). 
16. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
17. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
18. During the October 1991 Term, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which also joined Justice Scalia's 
majority opinion with some qualifications, and a concurring opinion in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), which joined only in the 
judgment. 
19. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Idaho v. 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
20. The third and fourth cases were both decided after the formal presentation of 
the Garrison lecture this past March. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 
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This is a striking result. The most significant vote has little 
direct expression in the Court's opinion writing. Justice Kennedy 
is the key to the majority in environmental protection and natural 
resources law cases today. Yet he almost never writes an opinion 
for the Court on these issues. 
The upshot is the exacerbation of the Court's longstanding 
lack of environmental voice. Justice White, who wrote most of the 
opinions, did not provide it. Justice Kennedy, who now appears to 
reflect the controlling philosophy for the Court in these cases, has 
similarly not yet expressed an overarching view of the environ-
mental law field. He has instead, like White during the 1970s and 
1980s, simply joined opinions that, because they are the products 
of shifting majority coalitions, lack any consistent or coherent 
theme. 
C. Justice Douglas vs. Justice Scalia: Scoring the Justices on 
Environmental Protection 
The last categorical inquiry concerns the voting patterns of 
individual Justices based on the relationship of their votes to envi-
ronmental protection objectives. When do their votes promote en-
vironmental protection? And when do their votes appear to 
undercut it? 
Most Court observers' intuitions regarding the Justices would 
likely be that those Justices who are considered "liberal" cast 
votes in favor of environmental protection concerns, while those 
more "conservative" members of the Court do not. To test that 
hypothesis, I undertook two detailed analyses of the votes of the 
Justices: one more qualitative and the other striving to be quanti-
tative. Interestingly, the more qualitative analysis questions the 
intuitive view, while the more quantitative approach restores 
some of its force. Each is discussed next. 
1. What is most immediately suggested by an admittedly un-
scientific, impressionistic review of the votes of individual Justices 
in environmental cases is the wholly paradoxical nature of the vot-
ing patterns if assessed exclusively from an environmental protec-
tion perspective.21 The votes of a few Justices in selected cases 
are illustrative. 
S. Ct. 1624 (1999); Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719 
(1999). 
21. My conclusions in this single respect are strikingly similar to those drawn by 
Professor Sive, based on his review in 1994 of the Supreme Court's environmental law 
rulings in the October 1993 Term. Remarking upon the odd voting patterns of indi-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, has a reputation in the 
environmental community for being unsympathetic to environ-
mental protection concerns. There are his votes against more ex-
pansive federal reserved water rights in national forests in United 
States u. New Mexico;22 against enhanced procedural rights for en-
vironmentalists in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.;23 against endangered species 
protection in Tennessee Valley Authority u. Hill;24 and in favor of a 
more aggressive regulatory takings test in both Penn Central u. 
City of New York 25 and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n u. 
DeBenedictis. 26 
Labeling the Chief Justice as somehow "anti-environmental" 
is problematic because many of his votes support environmental-
ist causes. He voted to uphold environmental criminal convictions 
in United States u. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. ;27 
supported the validity of stricter local noise controls in City of 
Burbank u. Lockheed Air Terminal;28 concluded that federal in-
stallations must comply with state air pollution control require-
ments in Hancock u. Train29 and joined the dissenters in Japan 
Whaling Ass'n u. American Cetacean Society30 in contending that 
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce was required to certify Japan for 
failing to comply with International Whaling Convention whaling 
quotas. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in a 
series of Dormant Commerce Clause cases stress the importance 
of the environmental protection goals as an affirmative reason for 
upholding the challenged governmental action.31 
Similar crisscrossing tendencies are evident in the votes of 
Justice Stevens, who is generally considered sympathetic to envi-
vidual Justices in those cases, Professor Sive characterized environmental cases as 
making for "strange judicial bedfellows" that Term. See David Sive & Daniel Riesel, 
An Analysis of the Justices' Positions in Environmental Cases Demonstrates that Doc-
trinal Classifications Aren't Very Useful, NAT'L L.J., October 3, 1994, at B5. 
22. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
23. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
24. 437 U.s. 153, 211 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
25. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
26. 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
27. 411 U.S. 655, 676 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
28. 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
29. 426 U.S. 167, 199 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
30. 478 U.S. 221, 241 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
31. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting), Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1992) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting). 
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ronmental protection concerns. Stevens' opinions, widely hailed 
by the environmental community, include his opinion for the 
Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n,32 and his dissents in 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,33 Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council,34 Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo,35 and Sec-
retary of the Interior v. California.36 
But environmentalists do not similarly acclaim Stevens' dis-
sents in California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock,37 favoring 
preemption of state environmental regulation of mining activities 
on federal land; in Penn Central, against the constitutionality of a 
state historic landmark designation challenged as a regulatory 
taking;38 and in Environmental Defense Fund v. City ofChicago,39 
rejecting the Environmental Defense Fund's claim that an exemp-
tion from a federal hazardous waste statute should be narrowly 
read. Several of Stevens' votes against positions favored by envi-
ronmentalists supplied the critical fifth vote for the majority's ad-
verse ruling, including United States v. New Mexico,40 Industrial 
Union v. American Petroleum,41 and Japan Whaling Ass'n.42 
For almost all of the Justices, a similar pattern is evident. 
Whatever the particular Justice's reputation, significant counter-
examples are available. Whether it is Justice Brennan, authoring 
the environmentalist's nightmare of a dissent in San Diego Gas 
Electric v. City of San Diego,43 which subsequently became the 
Court's holding in First English Evangelical Church v. County of 
Los Angeles,44 or Justice O'Connor, dissenting in First English,45 
and in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,46 in which she supported NRDC's more envi-
32. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
33. 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
34. 505 U.S. 1003, 1061 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
35. 456 U.S. 305, 322 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
36. 464 U.s. 312, 344 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
37. 480 U.S. 572, 594 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
38. 438 U.s. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, Burger, Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
39. 511 U.S. 328, 340 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
40. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
41. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
42. 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
43. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
44. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
45. See id. at 322 (O'Connor, J., joining in part, Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., 
dissenting). 
46. 470 U.S. 116, 165 (1985). 
HeinOnline -- 17 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 10 1999-2000
10 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17 
ronmentally protective reading of the Clean Water Act, while 
Justice Brennan did not.47 
2. A more quantitative approach to the Justices' voting sug-
gests, however, some discernible patterns and tendencies in the 
votes of the Justices in environmental cases. These tendencies 
mayor may not be sufficiently strong to suggest a correlation be-
tween the votes and overarching labels such as "conservative" or 
"liberal." But, in either event, they strongly suggest that, at least 
for some justices, the environmental dimension of the case is rele-
vant to how the Justice casts his or her vote in that case. 
The objective of this analysis is to construct a scoring system 
somewhat reminiscent of that employed by the League of Conser-
vation Voters Test in scoring members of Congress on environ-
mental matters.48 Here, however, it is applied to the Justices. A 
Justice is awarded one point for each pro-environmental protec-
tion outcome for which the Justice voted. The final score, referred 
to as an "EP score," is based on the percentage of pro-environ men-
tal votes the Justice cast, out of those cases in which that Justice 
participated. For the purposes of calculating this score, the entire 
database of 243 cases is not used. The scores are instead based on 
a subset of approximately 100 cases, representing those cases that 
are more susceptible to being assigned a pro-environmental posi-
tion.49 An EP score of 100 means that a Justice voted for the envi-
ronmentally-protective outcome in all the cases in which she 
participated. A score of zero means that the Justice voted for that 
environmental outcome in none of the cases. 
With regard to those Justices who were the most environmen-
tally-protective, the scores are both easy and not surprising in 
their results.50 The highest score went to Justice Douglas, who 
47. Justice Brennan joined Justice White's majority opinion, supplying the 
needed fifth vote for EPA and against NRDC. See id. at 116. 
48. See League of Conservation Voters, League of Conservation Voters National 
Environmental Scorecard (visited May 28, 1999) <http://www.lcv.orglscorecards/ 
index.htm>. 
·49. The cases upon which the EP Scores are based are those listed in italics in the 
appendix. 
50. The EP scores for the nineteen Justices who have served on the Court since 
October Term 1969 are Chief Justice Burger (34.3), Justices Black (75), Blackmun 
(50.3), Brennan (58.5), Breyer (66.6), Douglas (100), Ginsburg (63.6), Harlan (33.3), 
Kennedy (25.9), Marshall (61.3), O'Connor (30.4), Powell (30), Chief Justice Rehnquist 
(36.5), Scalia (13.8), Souter (57.1), Stevens (50.6), Stewart (42.6), Thomas (20), and 
White (36.3). For a full description of the database upon which the EP analysis was 
performed, see Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental" About Environ-
mental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703 (2000). 
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scored 100. Justice Douglas may well be the only environmental 
Justice ever on the Court, at least in modern times. Notwith-
standing his high profile, Justice Douglas was, as a practical mat-
ter, barely there for modern environmental law. He was off the 
Court by 1975, and plagued by serious health problems during his 
final time on the Court. As a result, he voted in only fifteen of the 
100 cases surveyed for the EP Score. 
The highest EP scores for those Justices serving on the Court 
for substantial time are those of Justices Brennan (58.5), Marshall 
(61.3) and Stevens (50.6).51 Each of their scores, however, is much 
lower than Douglas' score. None of these other scores is suffi-
ciently high to suggest that the environmental protection dimen-
sion of the various cases before the Court was a factor influencing 
their respective votes. 
The EP scoring analysis further identifies more Justices with 
potentially revealing EP scores on the low end, suggesting some 
possible skepticism, or perhaps even hostility, towards environ-
mental protection concerns or the kind of legal regime such con-
cerns promote. There are many EP scores below thirty-three, a 
number below thirty, and two below twenty-five. As with the high 
EP scores, there is a hands-down winner, though no score of zero 
to equal Justice Douglas' score of 100. And, as with Justice Doug-
las, there are no surprises at the lowest of the low end. 
The low score goes to Justice Scalia with a score just below 
fourteen, which is strikingly low. It is a score so low that one can 
fairly posit that Justice Scalia perceives environmental protection 
concerns as promoting a set of legal rules antithetical to that 
which he favors. Indeed, the kind oflegal system promoted by en-
vironmental law seems to be of sufficient concern that it even 
prompts Justice Scalia sometimes to abandon his views on core 
matters involving constitutional and statutory interpretation. 52 
51. Although the cases upon which the EP scores are based appear in the appen-
dix, infra, the full related database, including the voting breakdown in each of those 
cases, the case topic, the identity of the legal position in each case that received a 
point, and the final EP scores of each of the Justices, is not separately published here 
because of its substantial length. It instead appears in Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring 
What's "Environmental" About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev. 703 (2000). 
52. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992), embracing an interpretation ofthe Fifth Amend-
ment based on "our constitutional culture," and his dissenting opinion in Public Util-
ity District No.1 v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.s. 700, 724 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), reaching for a construction of the Clean Water Act favored by 
industry, are illustrative. See 511 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While I agree 
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What about Kennedy, the Court's current bellwether Justice 
who has been in the majority in virtually every environmental 
case before the Court since he joined the bench? His score is just 
below twenty-six, which is the third lowest out of nineteen Jus-
tices over the past thirty years. Although Justice Kennedy's score 
may well mask some significant potential for a future shift,53 it 
should be unsettling for environmentalists to learn that a score of 
twenty-six represents the Court's current point of equilibrium. 
3. Finally, viewed over time, the EP scores of the Justices in-
dicate that the Court as a whole is steadily becoming less respon-
sive to environmental protection. Indeed, the overall shift in the 
fate of environmental protection before the Court during the past 
three decades is telling. 54 In 1975, there were no Justices sitting 
on the Court with scores below thirty. Today, there are three with 
scores of thirty or below (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) and two 
with scores of twenty or below (Scalia and Thomas).55 
II. The Supreme Court's Apathy and Possible Antipathy 
Towards Environmental Protection: Lessons for the 
Current and Future Environmental Lawyer 
The overall trends suggest a troubling result for those looking 
to the Court to have an affirmative interest in promoting environ-
mental protection. Environmental protection concerns implicated 
fully with the thorough analysis in the Court's opinion, I add this comment for em-
phasis. For judges who find it unnecessary to go behind the statutory text to discern 
the intent of Congress, this is (or should be) an easy case."). 
53. Although Justice Kennedy's writing in the area remains sparse, he filed con-
curring opinions in three cases in which he expressed views that create at least the 
theoretical possibility of his breaking away from Justice Scalia's approach. See Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Eastern Enter-
prises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2154 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Richard 
Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENVT'L FORUM 8 (May/June 1999). 
54. These comparisons are based on the Justices' EP scores for their entire ca-
reers and not their EP scores as of the precise date to which the text refers. A refer-
ence to the EP scores of the Justices in 1975, therefore, considers the career EP scores 
of all the Justices who were serving on the Court in 1975, which will include their 
votes before and after 1975. The 1975 date simply determines the identity of the 
relevant Justices and does not confine the database with regard to precedent for pur-
poses of calculating EP scores. 
55. One must be careful, however, about too quickly equating the votes ofindivid-
ual Justices with Court rulings. The two do not necessarily correlate. For instance, 
forty environmentally favorable votes could reflect five unanimous rulings or nine 
five/four rulings. For that same reason, thirty environmentally favorable votes could 
reflect six favorable Court rulings and, therefore, more than forty environmentally 
favorable votes. 
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by a case appear, at best, to play no favored role in shaping the 
outcome. But nor does the outcome seem wholly neutral or indif-
ferent to the presence of those concerns. 
Over the past three decades, environmental protection con-
cerns seem increasingly to be serving a disfavored role in influenc-
ing the Court's outcome. The preferred outcome is one that places 
less, rather than more, weight on the need to promote environ-
mental protection. The Court's decisions, and the attitudes of the 
individual Justices, reflect increasing skepticism of the efficacy of 
environmental protection goals and the various laws that seek 
their promotion. This analysis leads to two significant conclusions 
worth further analysis. 
The first conclusion relates to the relative absence of any no-
tion, for most of the Justices during the past three decades, that 
environmental law is a distinct area of law, as opposed to just a 
collection of legal issues incidentally arising in a factual setting 
where environmental protection concerns are what is at stake. 
The Court's opinions lack any distinct environmental voice. Miss-
ing is any emphasis on the nature or character of environmental 
protection concerns and their import for judicial construction of 
relevant legal rules. The Court's decisions in TVA v. Hill,56 City of 
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,57 and Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,58 all represent 
significant, albeit rare, victories for environmental concerns in the 
Supreme Court. In none of those rulings, however, do those con-
cerns play an explicit positive role, if any, in the Court's analysis. 
Imagine, however, if Justice Douglas were on the Court and 
writing any of the Court's opinions in those three cases. The 
Court's rhetoric regarding environmental protection and its legal 
relevance would be far different. Recall his genuine passion in 
dissenting in Sierra Club v. Morton,59 in favor of expansive no-
tions of legal standing on behalf of "inarticulate members of the 
ecological group" (e.g. animals) where he argued in favor of legal 
doctrine providing a voice in court "all of the forms of life ... the 
pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings 
as well as the trout in the streams."60 Or consider Justice Black's 
emotional dissent in San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas 
56. 437 U.s. 153 (1978). 
57. 511 u.s. 328 (1994). 
58. 515 u.S. 687 (1995). 
59. 405 u.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 752. 
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Highway Commission,61 in which he decried cars "spew[ing] forth 
air and noise pollution,"62 he warned of mothers "grow[ing] anx-
ious ... lest their children be crushed beneath the massive wheels 
of interstate trucks,"63 and he described environmental laws as 
safeguarding "our Nation's well-being and our very survival."64 
Such emotion has meaning when it comes from the Supreme 
Court. 
For most of the Court, most of the time, environmental law 
has become no more than a subspecies of administrative law, rais-
ing no special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a 
substantive area of law. Environmental protection is merely an 
incidental context for resolution of a legal question. Recall again 
Justice White's decision to side with EPA in Chemical Manufac-
turers Ass'n v. NRDC,65 upholding the validity of variances for 
technology-based standards otherwise applicable to discharges of 
toxic effluent. He stressed in his note to Justice Marshall that res-
olution of the case did not make much of a difference to adminis-
trative law one way or the other.66 
What are the practical implications of the Court's approach to 
environmental law for someone wanting to be an environmental 
lawyer, or a lawyer concerned about environmental protection? 
First, to be an outstanding environmental lawyer requires your 
being an excellent lawyer. That means a law student zealously 
pursuing a career in environmental law should not just concen-
trate on taking "environmental law" classes. Master the "wilder-
ness" of administrative law.67 Delve into the complexities of 
federal courts and federal jurisdiction - likely the most impor-
tant course many environmental public interest litigators take in 
law school. Similarly, approach courses in corporations, tax, se-
curities, and real estate law. More often than not, the fate of the 
environmental interests will turn on the resolution of legal issues 
rooted deeply in these other areas of law. 
Likewise, as legal counsel, do not approach cases with envi-
ronmental blinders on. Be ready to see and understand the case 
or controversy in its broader legal context. And be ready to 
61. 400 U.S. 968 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
62. [d. at 969. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. at 971. 
65. 470 U.S. 116 (1985). 
66. See supra note 15, and accompanying text. 
67. See David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness 
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970). 
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master that broader legal context. Do not just read environmental 
cases. An environmental lawyer is likely to find the most impor-
tant, most relevant precedent elsewhere, precisely because it is 
elsewhere.68 
Indeed, because of environmental protection's apparent disfa-
vored status, the precedent most supportive of an environmen-
tally-protective outcome frequently can be found in cases where 
the favorable implications for environmental protection concerns 
are not at all immediately obvious. The challenge of the environ-
mental lawyer is to discover and exploit (and, when necessary, dis-
tinguish) that potentially relevant precedent. It may be in 
nonenvironmental standing cases such as the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins,69 which 
supports broadened standing in environmental cases involving in-
formation reporting requirements;70 or nonenvironmental regula-
tory takings cases such as Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 71 in which 
Justice Kennedy advances a more restricted approach to regula-
tory takings doctrine that could aid environmental regulators 
faced with such constitutional challenges.72 
The second closely related lesson for the environmental law-
yer is the importance of being strategic in framing and presenting 
environmental cases in litigation. An environmental lawyer, espe-
cially one representing interests that support enhanced environ-
mental protection measures, should not mistake her motivation 
and interest in the case for what is likely to prompt a favorable 
outcome in an administrative or judicial setting. The environmen-
tal lawyer must be open to the possibility that it may not be in her 
client's strategic interest to emphasize the environmental protec-
tion dimensions of the case at all. 
68. For example, the Supreme Court's ruling this past Term in Saenz v. Roe, 119 
S. Ct. 1518 (1999), resurrecting the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilege and Immuni-
ties Clause to strike down California's cap on welfare payments for new residents, 
may well trigger a new wave of constitutional challenges brought by property owners 
against environmental regulators based on that same Clause. See Carrie Johnson, 
The Road to Saenz v. Roe, 22 THE LEGAL TIMES 1, May 24, 1999; Clint Bolick, Back 
from the Grave - The Supreme Court Exhumes the 14th Amendment's 'Privileges or 
Immunities' Clause, 22 THE LEGAL TIMES 19, May 17, 1999. 
69. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
70. See Cass Sunstein, Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Be-
yond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 614-15, 621-24, 651-52, 663-67, 667-69 (1999). 
71. 524 U.S. 498, 539-47 (1998). 
72. See 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Richard Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENVT'L FORUM 8 (May/ 
June 1999). 
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An advocate needs, of course, to focus the decisionmaker on 
her best legal or policy arguments. Those that the advocate cares 
about, however, may not be those likely to motivate the deci-
sionmaker towards the preferred outcome. Like any good lawyer, 
the environmental lawyer needs to identify and address the deci-
sionmaker's concerns, and not make the mistake of assuming that 
she shares the advocate's own. 
The current Court is, at the very least, not a Court comprised 
of Justices looking at cases as "environmental law" cases. Other 
crosscutting issues are more likely to influence their votes rather 
than the environmental protection implications of one result over 
another. What the Justices believe, for instance, should be the 
relationship between courts and administrative agencies regard-
ing matters of statutory construction, or, the relationship between 
states and the federal government in their respective areas oflaw-
making. The Justices strive for consistency on these crosscutting 
issues that apply in a variety of contexts, of which environmental 
law seems to be just one of many. 
Different cases therefore require different strategies. For 
Justice Scalia, it may well be to turn the case into a plain meaning 
case, or a nonlegislative history case.73 Indeed, for Scalia, there 
may well be reason not to emphasize the positive environmental 
protection implications ofthe side that you are promoting. For the 
Chief Justice, it may well be to emphasize judicial integrity con-
cerns, including the autonomy of trial courts, the costs of frag-
mented litigation, premature judicial decision making, and 
possible burdens on the federaljudiciary.74 For Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor, it may well be the federalism implications of a par-
ticular outcome, stare decisis, concerns with judicial activism, and 
the sheer inequities of a particular result. 
73. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994); 
Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense 
Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
1, 15-19 (1995). 
74. The Chief Justice's concerns with preserving state sovereignty in the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause cases is one obvious example. See notes 23 to 32, supra, and 
accompanying text. Similar concerns seem to temper Rehnquist's views on the regu-
latory takings issue. See Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Hold· 
ings in the Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1099, 
1111-14 (1996); Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., Re: Agins v. City of Tiburon (May 29, 1980) (Official Papers of the Chambers of 
Justice Thurgood Marshall) ("I am somewhat uneasy about the latitude which your 
treatment of federal constitutional review oflocal zoning ordinances on pages 5 and 6 
of your present draft appears to give federal courts."). [d. 
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The more fundamental issue is whether, regardless of the 
strategic advantages of thinking outside the "environmental" box 
in environmental litigation, such a stripping of the "environment" 
out of environmental law is a positive or appropriate development 
for environmental law. My short answer is the law professor's 
classic "yes and no." Some stripping is appropriate, but not to the 
extent that has occurred in the Supreme Court. 
Why is it partially appropriate? Simply because the Justices' 
natural instinct about environmental law is partially correct: en-
vironmental law does not exist in a vacuum. Environmental law 
issues do arise in contexts that implicate other, very important 
crosscutting areas of law, such as administrative law, corporate 
law, Tenth Amendment law, Fifth Amendment law, and criminal 
law. 
Nor is it happenstance that environmental law constantly 
arises in these other contexts. So many different kinds of activi-
ties implicate environmental protection concerns that the legal re-
quirements serving that end must necessarily be widely 
applicable. Those legal requirements also necessarily create fric-
tion by restriking balances previously reached by other pre-ex-
isting legal rules governing that same activity. By promoting 
rapid change in the law in response to increased public demands 
for environmental protection, environmental law necessarily 
places great pressure on lawmaking institutions and generates 
conflicts between competing lawmaking fora, between sovereign 
authorities (local, state, tribal and federal) and within their re-
spective executive, judicial, and legislative branches. 
The Justices' focus in the first instance on these crosscutting 
issues is also quite proper. The Justices should strive for consis-
tency in their resolution. There should not always be one answer 
if environmental protection is at stake; and another answer if not. 
Such singularly outcome-dependent judicial reasoning could seri-
ously undermine the law's essential integrity and legitimacy. 
But that is not to say that environmental protection concerns 
are irrelevant when addressing those crosscutting issues. Such 
concerns legitimately inform the judicial resolution of those issues 
and sometimes justify striking a new and different balance. Envi-
ronmental protection concerns need not always be a dispositive 
factor to be legitimately so in some instances, and always to re-
main a relevant factor for separate consideration. 
In the early 1970s, the Court appeared to understand the 
broader implications of the nation's commitment to a legal regime 
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for environmental protection. The Court seemed to recognize its 
responsibility to account for the corresponding evolutionary pres-
sures being triggered by that emerging legal regime on other in-
tersecting areas of law and on lawmaking institutions. Since 
then, the Court has too often mistakenly equated the judiciary's 
involvement with such traditional, legitimate legal evolution with 
the 1980s judicial bugaboo of ''judicial activism." 
The cost of this mistaken belief is substantial. The Court de-
prives itself of its ability to consider the sheer importance of envi-
ronmental protection to the issues before the Court. Even more 
fundamentally, the Court fails to consider how the special chal-
lenges that environmental protection presents may warrant 
evolution in legal doctrine.75 
The Court's treatment of the issue of standing during the past 
three decades is emblematic of its attitude towards environmental 
law. The Court originally relaxed standing requirements in re-
sponse to the special challenges presented by environmental 
law.76 The Court revised the standing doctrine in recognition of 
the nature of the injuries at stake in environmental litigation be-
ing neither clearly economic nor physical.77 The Court likewise 
took special account of the inevitable, uncertain and speculative 
nature of such injuries, in particular, the more attenuated chain of 
causation between action and injury.78 
In recent years the Court has handed down a series of stand-
ing rulings that fails to consider these challenges and, as a result, 
makes it especially difficult for plaintiff citizens to maintain envi-
75. To be sure, one can perceive snippets of environmental law's influence in rare, 
isolated opinions of the Justices. Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas was most apt to 
see the relationship. For instance, in two cases in 1972, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare 
Lake Basin Water, 410 U.S. 719 (1972) and Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Wa-
tershed Improvement, 410 U.S. 743 (1972), the Court ruled that equal protection was 
not violated by a state statute that excluded tenants and permitted only landowners 
to vote for candidates for the water storage district and weighed their votes according 
to the value of the land each owned. Justice Douglas perceived the cases differently 
than the majority precisely because he understood the role that water played in the 
lives and ecosystem of the affected tenants. See 410 U.s. at 749 ("It is also inconceiv-
able that a body with the power to destroy a river by damming it and so deprive a 
watershed of one of its most salient environmental assets does not have 'sufficient 
impact' on the interests of people generally to invoke the principles of [this Court's 
voting rights precedent)"). [d. 
76. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 
658-64 (1986). 
77. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972). 
78. See United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973). 
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ronmental lawsuits. The trend has been so plain that it even 
prompted Justice Blackmun to question openly in dissent why the 
Court systematically disfavored environmental plaintiffs in the 
law of standing.79 
Another area is the law of regulatory takings. Here too, the 
Court's early case law suggested an appreciation for how environ-
mental protection and natural resource conservation concerns 
might justify a rethinking of the nature of private property rights 
in natural resources.80 But, the Court has since seemed more at-
tracted to a view of property that is static, not dynamic, and there-
fore restricts the legislature's constitutional authority to promote 
environmental protection.81 
Standing law and regulatory takings law are just two of the 
more obvious examples. The Court's need to consider the lessons 
supplied by environmental law in addressing crosscutting issues 
extends to less obvious areas as well, such as corporate law. Dur-
ing the October 1997 Term, for instance, in United States v. 
Bestfoods,82 the Court faced the question under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA),83 of the liability of a parent corporation for the actions 
of a subsidiary. What was striking about the oral argument 
before the Court was that the Justices were uniformly aware and 
sympathetic to the important policy objectives underlying corpo-
rate law's limited liability rules, but were not similarly aware of 
environmental law's competing concerns. Indeed, members of the 
Court appeared shocked to learn from both government and in-
dustry counsel, the undisputed common ground regarding con-
gressional intent in CERCLA in terms of corporate liability.84 
79. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition 
through the law of environmental standing.") [d. After the presentation of this Gar-
rison lecture and immediately before this article went to final press, the Supreme 
Court took an anticipated, yet important, step toward reversing this trend in a ruling 
noted later in this article. See infra, note 108. 
80. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Penn Central 
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1980). 
81. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City 
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
82. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1999). 
84. Official Transcript of the Oral Argument before the United States Supreme 
Court, United States v. Bestfoods, No. 97-454, pp. 16-17, 1998 U.s. Trans. Lexis 61 
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III. Bringing the "Environment" Back to Environmental 
Law: Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services 
The important remaining question is whether existing trends 
in the Court's approach to environmental law can be changed. 
Past experience strongly suggests that the answer to that ques-
tion may well depend on both the life experiences (professional 
and personal) that the current and future Justices bring with 
them to their work. It is no coincidence that the only Justice with 
a significantly high EP Score (100) is Justice Douglas, whose 
deeply-held views favoring environmental protection restrictions 
find their roots in his life-long involvement with the natural envi-
ronment as an avid hiker and outdoorsman.85 No current Justice 
has comparable links to the natural environment in general or to 
either resource conservation or environmental protection matters 
more particularly.86 
Perhaps the short answer to the question of how best to re-
store the "environment" to environmental law in the Court might 
be to find some way to provide individual Justices with personal 
experiences that allow them to appreciate more fully the environ-
mental stakes of the cases before the Court. But putting aside 
such extra-judicial influences, the most viable basis for persuad-
ing the Justices of the need for placing greater weight on the envi-
ronmental dimension of environmental law is going to be through 
the facts of the individual cases brought to the Court's attention. 
Each of those cases presents the Justices with a story about the 
way in which laws affect the quality of life. The cumulative effect 
of multiple stories can significantly affect the way the Justices de-
cide what cases to hear and how then to decide the legal issues 
presented. 
To the detriment of environmental protection concerns, the 
property rights movement has used this technique with enormous 
success. By bringing to the Court's attention during the past sev-
eral decades a series of cases, the factual allegations of which ap-
pear to support their claim of environmental regulatory 
(March 24,1998) (argument of Ms. Schiffer, counsel for the United States EPA); id. at 
26-27 (argument of Mr. Geller, counsel for Bestfoods). 
85. See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN, 203-36 (Delta Pub. 1974). 
86. The only current Justice with such possible strong personal ties to the natural 
environment might be Justice David Souter, based on his reputation as a hiker. See 
David Margolick, Bush's Court Choice: Ascetic at Home But Vigorous on Bench, N.Y. 
TrMES, July 25, 1990, at Al:3. 
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overreaching, such as claims of economic wipe-outs,87 or wheel-
chair-bound, blind widows being denied the right to build a dream 
home,88 these advocates have successfully fostered a general judi-
cial skepticism about the reasonableness of environmental laws. 
It is, of course, that same judicial skepticism that environ-
mentalists and environmental regulators must now overcome. 
Environmentalists and environmental regulators face a conun-
drum. As previously described, it is likely often not in their short 
term strategic interests to emphasize the environmental dimen-
sion of a case because of the Court's current skepticism. But, un-
less environmentalists begin to tell their own story to the Justices, 
they are unlikely to dispel that skepticism in the longer term. A 
simultaneous accomplishment of those two often conflicting objec-
tives will not be easy. It will require careful case management 
and case selection to bring to the Justices' attention cases that 
both instruct the Court on the important policies and values safe-
guarded by environmental protection laws and explain how such 
safeguarding is entirely consistent with our nation's legal 
traditions. 
There is currently at least some reason for optimism that the 
Court may be about to take an initial step in the right direction. 
The Court has agreed to review this October 1999 Term a poten-
tially very important environmental case, Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services.89 The Fourth Circuit's ruling 
under review in Laidlaw90 was an absolutely disastrous decision 
for environmentalists. But what made the lower court ruling so 
significant was that it was not so much the product of a mere aber-
rational court of appeals decision than it was suggestive of the ju-
risprudential signals that the Supreme Court has been sending 
out to the lower courts about the strict application of Article III 
case or controversy requirements to environmental citizen suits. 
For that same reason, however, the case provided the Court with 
the opportunity both to embrace the important role Congress in-
tended for citizen suits to serve in environmental law and to strike 
a balance in constitutional Article III doctrine that is more accom-
modating to that congressional scheme. 
87. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992). 
88. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); see Richard 
J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the United 
States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 184-86 (1997). 
89. 525 U.s. 1176 (1999). 
90. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 149 F.3d 303 (4th 
Cir. 1998). 
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In Laidlaw, the plaintiff, Friends of the Earth, brought a 
fairly routine citizen suit against an industrial facility owned by 
Laidlaw Environmental Services based on hundreds of violations 
of Laidlaw's Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System permit, both by exceeding allowable mercury dis-
charges and by violating monitoring and reporting require-
ments.91 No Gwaltney92 threshold jurisdictional problem was 
presented; no one disputed that the facility was in noncompliance 
both at the time the sixty day-notice and the subsequent lawsuit 
was filed. The trial took several years, however, and by the time 
the trial was complete, the company was no longer in noncompli-
ance. The district court, accordingly, declined any request for in-
junctive relief, but imposed more than $400,000 in civil penalties, 
payable to the U.S. Treasury, and expressly indicated that an at-
torney's fee award would similarly be forthcoming.93 
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed.94 The ap-
pellate court held that once the facility came into compliance, the 
case became moot.95 No Article III jurisdiction existed, the court 
ruled, for either a civil penalties award or for an attorney's fee 
award.96 The court, accordingly, ordered dismissal of the action in 
its entirety, an absolutely dramatic result. Consider the perverse 
incentive the appellate court's reasoning provides a regulated fa-
cility. So long as the facility comes into compliance prior to final 
judgment in a citizen suit enforcement action, a facility that has 
long been in violation of the federal environmental law, both 
before and after the filing of the complaint, cannot be subject to 
either a civil penalty or an attorney's fee award. The incentive to 
comply prior to suit is dramatically reduced. Also sharply re-
duced, if not wholly eliminated, is the longstanding incentive that 
defendants in environmental citizen suits have historically had to 
settle their cases. Such settlements have led to defendants' pay-
91. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. 588, 600·01, 610 (D. S.C. 
1997). 
92. In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.s. 49 
(1987), the Court held that Clean Water Act citizen suits could not be maintained for 
wholly past violations of that Act. See id. at 56-63. A plaintiff need, at a minimum, 
set forth in the complaint good faith allegations of violations ongoing at the time that 
the complaint is filed. See id. at 64-65. 
93. See 956 F. Supp. at 610-11. 
94. See 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998). 
95. See id. at 307. 
96. See id. at 306-07. The court's attorney's fee decision was especially remarka-
ble given that the court accompanied its ruling with a "but see" cite to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Gwaltney. See id. at 307. 
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ing hundreds of millions of dollars to support environmentally 
beneficial projects.97 
From a purely historical perspective, the Court's granting cer-
tiorari in Friends of the Earth was, standing alone, of surprising 
significance. The Court has heard almost 250 environmental 
cases on the merits during the past thirty years, yet this was only 
the second time that the Court granted a citizen suit petition in an 
environmental case at the sole request of the citizen plaintiffs. To 
be sure, the Justices have frequently done so at the behest of in-
dustry.98 Likewise, they have often granted review at the request 
of federal, state and local governments.99 But it has been twenty-
seven years since the Court last granted review at the exclusive 
request of environmental plaintiffs, and that was in Sierra Club v. 
Morton100 in 1972. 
There is also good reason to believe that the Court granted 
review in Friends of the Earth to rule in favor of the environmen-
tal plaintiffs. It takes four votes to grant review and it is unlikely 
that the four votes this time came from Justices seeking to affirm 
the Fourth Circuit's analysis. A Justice seeking to make it harder 
for environmental plaintiffs to bring suits would not pick this case. 
This is a case presenting a record in which the trial court found 
97. See Comment, Jeff Ganguly, Environmental Remediation Through Supple· 
mental Environmental Projects and Creative Negotiation: Renewed Community In-
volvement in Federal Enforcement, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 189 (1998); Comment, 
Laurie Droughton, Supplemental Environmental Projects: A Bargain for the Environ-
ment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 789 (1995). 
98. Two recent examples include The Steel Co. v. Citizens for A Better Environ-
ment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.s. 154 (1997), but there are 
many during the past three decades. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983); 
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Ac-
tion, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 
U.S. 49 (1988). 
99. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); California v. Sierra Club, 
451 U.S. 287 (1981); Watt v. Energy Action Education Foundation, 454 U.S. 151 
(1982); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Education Project, 454 U.S. 
139 (1982); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 
711 (1987); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.s. 332 (1989); Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
100. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The closest exception is provided 
by Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989). But, in Hallstrom, the Court 
granted certiorari (489 U.s. 1077 (1989)) only after asking the Solicitor General ofthe 
United States about the advisability of granting review (see 488 U.S. 811 (1989)) and 
then only after the United States filed a brief both advising the Court to hear the case 
on the merits and to rule against the environmental petitioners (see Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, No. 88-42 (filed 
February 17, 1989)), which the Court then did. 
HeinOnline -- 17 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 24 1999-2000
24 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17 
hundreds of violations occurring over many years. 101 The viola-
tions, moreover, involve discharges of mercury; not substances 
seemingly innocuous to a layperson or to a lay Justice. Mercury is 
a highly toxic subsistence that persists, rather than degrades, in 
the natural environment.102 The record further shows that the 
district court imposed a hefty fine of several hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, after finding that the company had enjoyed 
an economic benefit of over one million dollars because of those 
violations.103 
A Justice seeking to erect mootness or other Article III barri-
ers to citizen suit enforcement would look for a case with a very 
different record. Far preferable would be a case involving more 
seemingly innocuous pollutants,104 in order to both bolster possi-
ble suggestions of the frivolousness of the lawsuit and the lack of 
necessity for citizen suit enforcement overall. Finally, no clear cir-
cuit conflict was presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari 
because the Fourth Circuit relied upon a recent Supreme Court 
ruling, The Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, not yet 
considered in this identical context by other circuits. 
Of course, four votes do not a majority make. The necessary 
five-vote majority for the environmental plaintiffs in Friends of the 
Earth seems clearly in reach, however, in light of the Justices' 
past voting record. In particular, at least two Justices, Kennedy 
and O'Connor, seem quite open to the environmental plaintiff's 
contention that the lower court misapplied mootness doctrine. Ar-
ticle III jurisdictional requirements is an area where both Justices 
have written and/or joined separate opinions that reflect greater 
awareness of the need for legal doctrine to evolve in response to 
the special concerns raised by the demands of environmental pro-
tection. Justice O'Connor actually dissented in Lujan v. Defenders 
101. See 956 F. Supp. at 600-01. 
102. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER & 
JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION - LAw, SCIENCE, & POLICY 475 (1996). 
103. See id. at 610-11, 613. 
104. For example, some in the environmental community strongly urged the envi-
ronmental plaintiffs in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Magnesium 
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997) not to seek Supreme Court review. 
Although environmentalists were unanimously of the view that the Third Circuit's 
ruling on standing in Magnesium Elektron was very harmful, legally erroneous, and 
could form the basis of a strong petition for a writ of certiorari, there was far less 
agreement on the essential strategic inquiry whether the case presented the facts 
needed to make that legal argument in the strongest possible light. A substantial 
proportion of the alleged violations of the Clean Water Act at issue involved dis-
charges of salt and heat. See id. at 115. 
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of Wildlife, and joined Blackmun's opinion, which denounced the 
majority for its "slash and bum" of the law of environmental 
standing.105 Kennedy, the current bellwether Justice for deter-
mining the majority ruling,106 joined most of the majority opinion 
in that same case, but he also wrote separately to stress, along 
with Justice Souter, how environmental protection concerns 
might justify Congress' allowance of less concrete injuries and 
more attenuated chains of causation without offending Article III 
of the Constitution.107 
Were both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor to fashion a ma-
jority with Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg on the 
issues before the Court in Friends of the Earth, the resulting opin-
ion could begin to restore what makes environmental law "envi-
ronmental." The Court could acknowledge that environmental 
protection concerns warrant rethinking the way that Article III 
standing and mootness requirements are understood and applied. 
At the very least, the case represents an all-too-rare opportunity 
for the Court to take a positive step in that direction. lOB 
105. 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
106. See supra note 16 to 21 and accompanying text. 
107. See 504 U.S. at 580 ("Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
before.") (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
108. Subsequent events reveal that such a positive step has now been taken. The 
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Friends of the Earth on March 1, 1999 (see 
525 U.S. 1176 (1999)), which was a few days before the delivery of this Garrison lec-
ture. The case was argued in October 1999, several months after the written manu-
script for publication was complete. On January 12, 2000, just as this article was 
going to final press, the Court announced its decision in the case. See Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000). As anticipated, 
the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's mootness ruling. See 120 S.Ct. 693, 697 
(1999). The Court, moreover, also rejected Laidlaw's effort to defend the court of ap-
peals' judgment on the alternative ground that Friends of the Earth lacked Article III 
standing. See id. The Court rejected Laidlaw's contention that a citizen suit plaintiff 
must demonstrate actual injury to the natural environment. The Court ruled that 
injury to the environment is not the relevant inquiry for standing, which should in-
stead be whether the plaintiff has been injured. According to the Court, moreover, 
Friends of the Earth had established such injury by establishing that their members' 
reasonable concerns about the possible effects of the unlawful discharges had affected 
adversely their willingness to use the waterway at issue. See id. at 698. The Court 
further ruled that, because of their future deterrent effect, civil penalties could pro-
vide sufficient redress for citizen suit standing purposes even when the defendant was 
currently in compliance and those penalties were payable exclusively to the federal 
treasury. See id. The court's opinion departs significantly from some of the broader 
implications in the Court's recent standing precedent, adverse to environmental citi-
zen suit plaintiffs, discussed in this article's text. Justice Ginsburg authored the 
Court's opinion, joined by six others, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting 
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IV. Conclusion 
Bringing the "environment" back to "environmental law" is, of 
course, a long and not a short term undertaking. Even a ruling in 
a single case such as Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw is only that: 
a single ruling in a single case. It is a far cry from a reversal of the 
trend disfavoring environmental protection that is apparent in the 
Court's decisions during the past three decades. 
Nor will the longer term restoration, now warranted, occur as 
a result ultimately of the efforts of environmental lawyers of my 
generation, or the efforts of David Sive, Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers, or 
Ollie Houck. It will depend largely on the future efforts of today's 
law students, such as those here at Pace and at other law schools, 
who are about to embark on a career in environmental law. 
Environmental lawyers of my generation found inspiration in 
the work of those who came before us, including Lloyd Garrison. 
All I can hope for is that today's law students include some who 
will find the necessary inspiration in the work of those within my 
own generation of environmental lawyers and scholars; that they 
will be thoughtful, strategic advocates for environmental law's im-
portant goals, and that they will work towards environmental 
law's restoration in our nation's highest court. 
opinion, which Justice Thomas joined. The favorable outcome in the Supreme Court 
would seem to confirm the wisdom of the environmentalist strategy of not seeking 
review in earlier cases presenting far less favorable facts. See note 105, supra. 
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Appendix 
Environmental Cases Decided By The United States 
Supreme Court 
October Term 1969-0ctober Term 1998 
Cite Name* 
397 U.S. 88 Arkansas v. Tennessee 
397 U.S. 620 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma 
400 U.S. 48 Hickel v. Oil Shale 
401 U.S. 402 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 
401 U.S. 493 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp 
401 U.S. 520 United States v. District Court in and for the 
County of Eagle 
401 U.S. 527 United States v. District Court in and for Water 
Division No.5 
402 U.S. 159 United States v. Southern Ute Tribe of Band of 
Indians 
402 U.S. 558 United States v. International Minerals & Chemical 
Corp. 
403 U.S. 9 Utah v. United States 
405 U.S. 727 Sierra Club v. Morton 
406 U.S. 91 Illinois v. Milwaukee 
406 U.S. 109 Washington v. General Motors Corp. 
406 U.S. 117 Nebraska v. Iowa 
409 U.S. 80 United States v. Jim 
409 U.S. 470 Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United 
States 
410 U.S. 73 EPA v. Mink 
410 U.S. 641 Ohio v. Kentucky 
410 U.S. 719 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
410 U.S. 743 Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed 
Improvement 
411 U.S. 325 Askew v. American Waterway Operators 
411 U.S. 624 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc 
411 U.S. 655 United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical 
Corp. 
412 U.S. 481 Mattz v. Arnett 
412 U.S. 541 Fri v. Sierra Club 
412 U.S. 580 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co. 
412 U.S. 669 United States v. SCRAP Aberdeen and Rockfish 
Railroad Co. v. SCRAP 
414 U.S. 44 Department of Game of the State of Washington v. 
The Puyallup Tribe 
414 U.S. 313 Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona 
415 U.S. 289 Mississippi v. Arkansas 
416 U.S. 1 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 
416 U.S. 861 Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v. 
Western Alfalfa Corp 
* Italicized case names are those used in the "EP" scoring. 
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1970 
1970 
1970 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
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1973 
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1973 
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1973 
1973 
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1974 
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Cite 
420 U.S. 35 
420 U.S. 136 
420 U.S. 194 
420 U.S. 304 
420 U.S. 395 
420 U.S. 515 
420 U.S. 529 
420 U.S. 531 
421 U.S. 60 
421 U.S. 240 
422 U.S. 13 
422 U.S. 184 
422 U.S. 289 
424 U.S. 295 
425 U.S. 649 
426 U.S. 1 
426 U.S. 128 
426 U.S. 167 
426 U.S. 200 
426 U.S. 363 
426 U.S. 465 
426 U.S. 529 
426 U.S. 776 
427 U.S. 246 
427 U.S. 390 
429 U.S. 363 
430 U.S. 112 
431 U.S. 99 
431 U.S. 265 
434 U.S. 275 
435 U.S. 151 
435 U.S. 519 
436 U.S. 371 
436 U.S. 604 
437 U.S. 153 
437 U.S. 617 
438 U.S. 59 
438 U.S. 104 
438 U.S. 645 
438 U.S. 696 
440 U.S. 391 
440 U.S. 668 
441 U.S. 322 
Name* 
Train v. City of New York 
Train v. Campaign Clean Water 
Antoine v. Washington 
Utah v. United States 
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power 
Comm'n Arizona PSC v. Chemehuevi Tribe of 
Indians FPC v. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians 
United States v. Maine 
United States v. Louisiana 
United States v. Florida 
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness 
Society 
United States v. Louisiana 
United States v. Alaska 
Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP; United 
States v. SCRAP 
Alamo Land & Cattle Co v. State of Arizona 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast 
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Group 
Cappaert v. United States 
Hancock v. Train 
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources 
Control Board 
New Hampshire v. Maine 
Texas v. Louisiana 
Kleppe v. New Mexico 
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers 
Association 
Union Electric Co. v. EPA 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club 
Oregon ex reI. State Land Board v. Corvallis 
E I DuPont de Nemours v. Train 
EPA v. Brown 
Douglas v. Seacoast Prod 
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States 
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC 
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana 
Andrus v. Charles tone Stone Prod 
TVA v. Hill 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Grp 
Penn Central Transp v. City of New York 
California v. United States 
United States v. New Mexico 
Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency 
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States 
Hughes v. Oklahoma 
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1977 
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1978 
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1978 
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1978 
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Year 
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442 U.S. 347 Andrus v. Sierra Club 1979 
442 U.S. 653 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 1979 
443 U.s. 658 Washington v. Washington State Commercial 1979 
Passenger Fishing Vessel 
444 U.s. 51 Andrus v. Allard 1979 
444 U.S. 164 Kaiser Aetna v. United States 1979 
444 U.S. 206 Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp 1979 
444 U.S. 223 Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen; 1980 
City of New York v. Karlen; Secretary of HUD v. 
Karlen 
444 U.S. 335 Ohio v. Kentucky 1980 
445 U.S. 193 Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle 1980 
445 U.S. 198 Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation 1980 
445 U.S. 253 United States v. Clarke 1980 
445 U.S. 535 United States v. Mitchell 1980 
445 U.S. 715 Andrus v. Idaho 1980 
446 U.S. 253 United States v. Louisiana 1980 
446 U.S. 500 Andrus v. Utah 1980 
446 U.s. 578 Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. 1980 
446 U.S. 657 Andrus v. Shell Oil Co. 1980 
447 U.S. 1 United States v. California 1980 
447 U.S. 125 California v. Nevada 1980 
447 U.S. 255 Agins v. City of Tiburon 1980 
447 U.S. 352 Bryant v. Yellen 1980 
448 U.S. 242 United States v. Ward 1980 
448 U.S. 371 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians 1980 
448 U.S. 607 Industrial Union v. American Petroleum 1980 
449 U.S. 64 EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn 1980 
449 U.S. 456 State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 1981 
450 U.s. 544 State of Montana v. United States 1981 
450 U.S. 621 San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego 1981 
451 U.S. 259 Watt v. Alaska 1981 
451 U.S. 287 California v. Sierra Club 1981 
452 U.S. 264 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 1981 
Act 
452 U.S. 314 Hodel v. Indiana 1981 
453 U.S. 1 Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National 1981 
Sea Clammers Assn 
453 U.S. 490 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 1981 
453 U.S. 609 Commonwealth Edison v. State of Montana 1981 
454 U.S. 139 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii Peace 1981 
Education Project 
454 U.S. 151 Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation 1981 
454 U.S. 516 Texaco v. Short 1982 
456 U.S. 305 Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo 1982 
457 U.S. 55 Zobel v. Williams 1982 
457 U.S. 273 California ex reI. State Lands Comm'n v. United 1982 
States 
458 U.S. 941 Sporhase v. Nebraska 1982 
459 U.S. 176 Colorado v. New Mexico 1982 
* Italicized case names are those used in the "EP" scoring. 
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460 U.S. 300 North Dakota v. United States 1983 
460 U.S. 605 Arizona v. California 1983 
460 U.S. 766 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear 1983 
Energy 
461 U.S. 190 Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources 1983 
Conservation and Development Comm'n 
461 U.s. 273 Block v. North Dakota 1983 
462 U.S. 36 Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc 1983 
462 U.S. 87 Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC 1983 
462 U.S. 554 Texas v. New Mexico 1983 
462 U.S. 1017 Idaho ex reI. Evans v. Oregon 1983 
463 U.S. 110 Nevada v. United States 1983 
463 U.S. 206 United States v. Mitchell 1983 
463 U.S. 545 Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Indians 1983 
464 U.S. 238 Silkwood v. Kerr Mc-Gee Corp. 1984 
464 U.S. 312 Secretary of the Interior v. California 1984 
466 U.S. 96 Louisiana v. Mississippi 1984 
466 U.S. 198 Summa Corp v. California 1984 
466 U.S. 765 Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of 1984 
Mission Indians 
467 U.S. 1 Kirby Forest Industries v. United States 1984 
467 U.S. 229 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 1984 
467 U.S. 310 Colorado v. New Mexico 1984 
467 U.S. 837 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 1984 
467 U.S. 986 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 1984 
469 U.S. 274 Ohio v. Kovacs 1985 
469 U.s. 504 United States v. Maine 1985 
470 U.S. 93 United States v. Louisiana 1985 
470 U.S. 116 Chemical Manufacturer's Ass'n v. NRDC 1985 
471 U.S. 84 United States v. Locke 1985 
471 U.S. 759 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians 1985 
473 U.S. 172 Williamson County Regional Planning v. Hamilton 1985 
Bank 
473 U.S. 568 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co 1985 
473 U.S. 753 Oregon Dept of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe 1985 
474 U.S. 121 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes 1985 
474 U.S. 494 Midlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l 1986 
Protection 
475 U.S. 1 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 1986 
Commn of Calif 
475 U.S. 89 United States v. Maine 1986 
475 U.S. 355 Exxon Corp. v. Hunt 1986 
476 U.S. 227 Dow Chemical v. United States 1986 
476 U.S. 498 South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe 1986 
476 U.S. 834 United States v. Mottaz 1986 
477 U.S. 131 Maine v. Taylor 1986 
477 U.S. 207 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire 1986 
477 U.S. 340 MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County 1986 
478 U.S. 221 Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc. 1986 
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478 U.S. 546 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council 1986 
for Clean Air 
478 U.S. 597 United States v. James 1986 
479 U.S. 481 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette 1987 
480 U.S. 370 Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action 1987 
480 U.S. 470 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis 1987 
480 U.S. 531 Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell 1987 
480 U.S. 572 California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co. 1987 
480 U.S. 700 United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 1987 
481 U.S. 412 Tull v. United States 1987 
481 U.S. 704 Hodel v. Irving 1987 
482 U.S. 124 Texas v. New Mexico 1987 
482 U.S. 193 Utah Division of State Lands v. United States 1987 
482 U.S. 304 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 1987 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles 
483 U.S. 711 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council 1987 
for Clean Air 
483 U.S. 825 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n 1987 
484 U.S. 49 Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay 1987 
Foundation 
484 U.S. 469 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi 1988 
484 U.S. 495 ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri 1988 
485 U.S. 88 United States v. Louisiana 1988 
485 U.S. 439 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n 1988 
490 U.S. 163 Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New Mexico 1989 
490 U.S. 332 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council 1989 
490 U.S. 360 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council 1989 
491 U.S. 1 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 1989 
491 U.S. 350 New Orleans Public Service Inc. v. City of New 1989 
Orleans 
492 U.S. 408 Philip Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands 1989 
of Yakima Indiana Nation 
493 U.S. 20 Hallstrom v. Tillamook County 1989 
495 U.S. 490 California v. FERC 1990 
496 U.S. 530 General Motors Corp v. United States 1990 
497 U.S. 871 Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 1990 
500 U.S. 380 Illinois v. Kentucky 1991 
501 U.S. 221 Oklahoma v. New Mexico 1991 
501 U.S. 597 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier 1991 
502 U.S. 437 Wyoming v. Oklahoma 1992 
503 U.S. 91 Arkansas v. Oklahoma 1992 
503 U.S. 429 Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society 1992 
503 U.S. 519 Yee v. City of Escondido 1992 
503 U.S. 569 United States v. Alaska 1992 
503 U.S. 607 United States Department of Energy v. Ohio 1992 
504 U.S. 334 Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt 1992 
504 U.S. 353 Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of 1992 
Natural Resources 
504 U.S. 555 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 1992 
505 U.S. 88 Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n 1992 
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505 U.S. 144 
505 U.s. 557 
505 U.S. 1003 
506 U.S. 73 
507 U.S. 584 
508 U.S. 679 
511 U.S. 93 
511 U.S. 328 
511 U.s. 383 
511 U.S. 700 
511 U.S. 809 
512 U.s. 43 
512 U.S. 374 
513 U.S. 527 
514 U.S. 673 
515 U.S. 1 
515 U.S. 687 
516 U.S. 22 
516 U.S. 365 
516 U.S. 479 
519 U.S. 234 
519 U.S. 355 
520 U.S. 154 
520 U.S. 725 
521 U.S. 1 
521 U.S. 261 
521 U.S. 507 
521 U.S. 591 
522 U.S. 329 
522 U.S. 520 
523 U.S. 83 
523 U.S. 726 
523 U.S. 767 
524 U.S. 38 
524 U.S. 51 
526 U.S. 687 
526 U.S. 865 
Name* 
New York v. United States 
City of Burlington v. Dague 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
Mississippi v. Louisiana 
Nebraska v. Wyoming 
South Dakota v. Bourland 
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl 
Quality of the State of Oregon 
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund 
C&A Carbone Inc v. Town of Clarkstown 
PUD, No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept 
of Ecology 
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States 
City of Ladue v. Gilleo 
Dolan v. City of Tigard 
Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co; City of 
Chicago v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. 
Kansas v. Colorado 
Nebraska v. Wyoming 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Colorado 
Louisiana v. Mississippi 
United States v. Maine 
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. 
Babbitt v. Youpee 
Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Association 
Bennett v. Spear 
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
United States v. Alaska 
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho 
City of Boerne v. Flores 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe 
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Government 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 
Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club 
New Jersey v. New York 
United States v. Beggerly 
United States v. Bestfoods 
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes 
Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute 
Indian Tribe 
* italicized case names are those used in the "EP" scoring. 
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